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Abstract 
 
Recently, many corporations have applied CMM, SPICE or other software process maturity 
models to developing software products. These models are recommended to change from 
qualitative process management to quantitative management as they reach a certain level of 
maturity. Quantitative process management is possible only when reliable data exist. If 
quantitative process management are conducted when data’s reliability are not ensured, 
adverse effects can be caused by the false management activities. That is why so many 
methods have been studied to analyze reliability of collected data. Most of them, however, 
are analysis methods for already collected data. Therefore, if the analysis finds that the 
existing data are not reliable, the data should be abandoned and new data be collected again, 
causing need to consume much time and effort. Therefore, as a way to secure reliability of 
data to be used for quantitative process management when they are input in the first place, 
this paper suggests a method applying the second level meta game of non-cooperative, 
bimatrix games to collecting data for quantitative measurement. 
 
Keywords: S/W Measurement, S/W Metrics, S/W Quality, Game theory, Quantitative 
management, Software engineering. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
One object of software engineering is “producing high-quality products at minimum cost, 
within a short period.?[1]. To this end, many methods and tools, models have been developed. 
Among them are CMM(Capability Maturity Model)[2] of SEI(Software Engineering Institute) 
and SPICE(Software Process Improvement & Capability determination)[3] of ISO/IEC 
15504 TR2(Technical Report Type 2). Those models recommend that, if maturity of process 
reaches a certain level, metrics of development be quantitatively measured and used for 
quantitative management. 
Quantitative management is a technique to perform a task by representing performance 
data in numbers and setting the quantitative goals based on the numbers. In quantitative 
management, most important is reliability of collected data. If reliability of the data is not 
guaranteed, the quantitative management based on the data is also meaningless.  
Many methods have been studied to analyze reliability of collected data. Most of them, 
however, are just analysis methods for already collected data. Therefore, this paper suggests a 
technique applying a game theory to collecting input data as a way to secure reliability of 
data to be collected.  
This paper consists of following parts: Chapter2 outlines of measure, game theory in S/W 
engineering, and business psychology; Chapter3 reviews obstacles to data collecting and 
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analysis of their weight values; Chapter4 deals with the technique applying a game theory to 
collecting data to be measured in order to get reliable data; Chapter5 demonstrates the 
technique described in the forth chapter through simulation; finally, Chapter 6 concludes this 
paper and provides study direction for the future.  
 
2. Related Research 
2.1 Measure in Software Engineering 
In software engineering, measure is used for three purposes: for software process 
improvement; for project management involving estimation, quality management, 
productivity evaluation, and project control; as a data to make a technical decision when 
implementing a project.  
Lord Kelvin once said, ?When you can measure what you are speaking about, and 
express it in numbers, you know something about it. But when you cannot measure it, when 
you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meager and unsatisfactory kind.?
[4] This means that software is hard to manage the development process, compared to 
hardware, because software development process, in much part, is highly dependant on 
people and thus, the measure is mainly qualitative. But if managed by quantitative measure, it 
can be managed in effective and systematic way. 
 
2.2 Software Process Model 
CMM and SPICE represent software process models. CMM consists of 5 maturity levels 
from 1 to 5: level 1 is Initial; level 2 is Managed; level 3 is Defined; level 4 is Quantitatively 
Managed; level 5 is Optimizing. On the other hand, SPICE have 6 maturity levels from 0 to 6: 
level 0 is Incomplete; level 1 is Performed; level 2 is Managed; level 3 is Established; level 4 
is Predictable; level 5 is Optimizing.  
The maturity levels of the two models are actually similar in meaning although they are 
referred to differently and SPICE has level 0 while CMM doesn’t have. In both of the models, 
qualitative estimation by operating the process with certain special qualities is possible up to 
level 3. But from level 4, the process performance data should be measured to help 
understand the present state, improve the process through analysis of defects and removal of 
the causes, and facilitate quantitative estimation and future decision-making. 
 
2.3 Game Theory 
Game theory can be defined as a study of mathematical models about conflict and 
cooperation between rational decision-makers. Game theory using mathematical technique 
was designed to analyze situations when more than 2 parties should make a decision which 
will have an effect on their own interest under various possibilities of cooperation or conflict. 
This theory was first introduced in 1944 by a physicist and mathematician, Jon von Neumann 
and economist Oskar Morgenstern.  
A game consists of player (at least 2 players), player’s strategy, outcome of decision, and 
payoff, numerical value of the outcome. 
Outcome is dictated by who selects which strategy. Therefore, each competitor should select 
a strategy which can maximize his or her own interest (performance) no matter what strategy 
other competitor(s) will employ.  
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According to number of competitors, games are classified into two types: two person game 
(e.g. chess)  and multi-person game or n-person game (e.g. poker). The most common form 
of games is two person zero-sum game in which the sum of all payoffs to all players is zero 
because one player’s winning necessarily means the other’s loss if there is conflicting interest 
between players. According to number of strategies employed by players, games are also 
classified into two types: finite game and infinite game (for the purpose of continuing the 
play). Finite two person zero sum games[8] are most widely used in theory.  
This paper applies the second level meta game of non-cooperative bimatrix games, to data 
collecting in order to secure reliability of data to be collected and measured in developing 
software. 
 
2.4 Business Psychology 
Psychological factors among developers also affect developing software. For leaders of 
software developing organizations, it is a difficult job to induce software developers to 
welcome additional work of collecting metrics, other than developing software. It is 
pointless to attribute all of this to young generation’s individualism or selfishness. Leaders 
of organizations should understand the group psychology in the situation[11][12][13].  
For instance, when a person hears the voice of somebody with epilepsy from the next 
room, if he is alone, the probability for him to give help is 85%. But, when he knows another 
4 people, besides him, hear the voice, the probability will be reduced to 31%. In addition, 
longer time will be taken to take an action. This is a very well-known experiment in 
psychology field[7].  
By the same principle, metrics collected in small group and in large group are somewhat 
different in terms of reliability. That is because individuals tend to feel less sense of 
responsibility in larger group due to diffusion of responsibility. One of psychologies fanning 
this trend is bystander effect in which people think, “Someone else will take responsibility” 
and want to stay low profile in the group. Therefore, it is needed to secure reliability of input 
data by motivating developers more actively and effectively, instead of just waiting until 
they input accurate metrics data to be measured. 
 
3. Collecting Measurement Data 
One of the biggest differences of software and hardware development is the level of 
visibility provided. For example, design and implementation of software are represented as 
conceptual modeling and logical codes. But in the case of hardware, it is designed intuitively 
using 3 dimensional CAD and implemented through combination of physical matters instead 
of logical codes, securing enough visibility.  
Therefore, as a way to secure visibility and transparency in software development, it is 
strongly recommended to measure relevant data which are obtained on the course of 
development, and utilize the outcomes in project management. 
 
3.1 Criteria of Data Collecting 
For this paper, data were collected from 35 S/W developers of 5 organizations. Based on 
following 5 criteria, 27 metrics of the data were selected.  
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(1) Is data collecting possible? 
(2) Is it contributing to improvement of Quality, Cost, Delivery, Productivity? 
(3) Does it correspond to SPI (Software Process Improvement) strategy? 
(4) Is the equality among developing organizations secured? 
(5) Can reliability of the data be ensured? 
 
Metrics as selected based on criteria above are shown in table 3-1(Metrics Table)  
Table 3-1 Metrics Table of Measurement Data 
 
 
3.2 Obstacles to Secure Reliability of Input Data 
For software developers who always feel stress of developing software, collecting metrics 
data is not easy. Therefore, if they are forced to collect data, data can be distorted when they 
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input the data. Therefore, it is important to know exactly which factors are burdensome in 
inputting data and remove them in order to get accurate input data from developers.  
Following Figure 3-1 is burdensome factors to developers obtained from a survey. 
 
 
Figure 3-1 Pareto Chart for analysis of burdensome factors to developers 
 
Figure 3-1 shows the results obtained from a survey of 35 software developers. The surveyed 
items were developed through interview with developers. Description of each item is as 
follows. 
 
Additional effort: additional effort required to input measurement data, besides software 
development work. 
Uneasiness: sense of burden that the input data may be used as a data for evaluating an 
individual. 
Uncertainty: uncertainty about whether the  quantitative management will bring actual 
benefits to developers. 
Failure to meet deadline: Uneasiness that additional work of data input can cause failure to 
meet deadline. 
Sense of rejection: sense of rejection toward learning about new input system. 
Difficulty in understanding: lack of understanding about input items 
Vagueness: Vagueness of input range 
Complicatedness: complicatedness caused by data input is conducted from too many sources. 
 
The survey shows, as shown in Figure 3-1, that three major burdensome factors when 
developers input data are additional effort required to input measurement data besides 
software development work, sense of burden that the input data may be used as a data for 
evaluating an individual, uncertainty about the benefits quantitative management will bring. 
The three factors combined account for 78.8%.  
The three factors can be reduced by introducing new tools, but unfortunately, cannot be 
completely removed, for collecting measurement data. Therefore, this paper suggests a way 
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to apply the second level meta game out of non-cooperative bimatrix games♣, in order to 
secure reliability of input data. 
 
3.3 Analysis of Weight of Obstacles  
The biggest obstacles to collecting accurate data are, as shown in Figure 3-1, boil down to 
three factors (additional effort, uneasiness, uncertainty). The third factor, uncertainty, is 
represented, here, as “profit of management” from qualitative management. After educating 
software developers enough about effects of quantitative management, another survey of the 
developers on the three factors was conducted again. As a result, weight values as shown in 
Table 3-2 were obtained. 
Table 3-2 Weight Values for Major factors 
 
 
Table 3-3 is a matrix table of payoffs for developer A according to each strategy, based on 
these weight values. 
Table 3-3 Distribution of Payoff according to strategy 
 
 
In the case that developer A selects ? strategy, if developer B chooses ? strategy too, 
ultimate payoff of A is 0. If B adopts ? strategy, payoff for A is –10 due to false 
management, instead of plus gains from correct management. Finally, if B chooses ? 
strategy, data collecting is considered to fail because the size of the entire statistical 
population is too small. In this case, gains by A from quantitative management is 0, and there 
is no worry about being evaluated. Therefore, -5, value of additional effort for inputting data 
is the ultimate payoff of A. Table 3-3 shows payoffs calculated in that method. 
 
 
 
4. Application of Game Theory 
4.1 Dominant Strategy and Pure Strategy Equilibrium Point 
Software developers have three strategies available as shown in Table 3-3.  For developer 
A’s side, ? strategy out of the three strategies generates the largest payoff. In this case, ? 
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strategy of A dominates over others. Table 4-1 shows the movement diagram of developer 
A’s payoffs in Table 3-3, based on dominant strategy. 
Table 4-1 Movement Diagram of Developer A’s Payoffs 
 
 
Analysis of the movement diagram in Table 4-1 shows us that arrows converge on number 
 , which means   is equilibrium point of pure strategy. But for developer B’s side, the 
equilibrium point is  . In other words, if all developers are allowed to head for equilibrium 
points of pure strategy with which they can maximize their own payoff, all developers will 
adopt ? strategy, and thus, number   will become Nash equilibrium[10]. That is why 
collecting measurement data itself are not easy. If there is no input data, quantitative 
management is impossible. As a solution to this, this paper adopts a somewhat forceful way 
for measurement data entry.   
The way involves inducing developers to input measurement data by imposing penalty on 
those who fail to input data. The movement diagram of this case corresponds to movement 
diagram of payoff when the third strategy, ?, of developer is excluded from Table 4-1. The 
movement diagram is shown in Table 4-2. 
Table 4-2  Movement Diagram of Payoff when Strategy ? is Excluded 
 
 
In Table 4-2, equilibrium point of pure strategy for developer A’s payoff is number  . Like 
case in Table 4-1, all of developers can maximize their own payoff when they select strategy 
?. Therefore, if all of them pursue for strategy ?, number of cases   will become Nash 
equilibrium point and the ultimate payoff of developers will be  . But, number   is 
non-Pareto optimal outcome as   generates more payoff than  . In other words, in Table 
4-2, non-Pareto optimal outcome   is selected instead of Pareto optimal outcome  . This 
result shows that individual rationality based on principle of domination and group rationality 
based on Pareto principle do not correspond 
 
4.2 Prisoner’s Dilemma 
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Like the case in Table 4-2, non-zero sum game which has an equilibrium point, but 
non-Pareto optimal is called Prisoner’s Dilemma[9]. It is referred as to the case in which 
players come to select non-Pareto optimal strategy if all players pursue their own maximum 
payoff, even though there is a Pareto optimal strategy available which provides maximum 
payoff to every one [5].  
 
4.2.1 Exclusion of Strategy ?  
As a solution to this dilemma, strategy ? can be excluded from Table 4-2, like from 
Table 4-1 in order to obtain Pareto optimal strategy. But exclusion of strategy ? is 
impossible. Exclusion means here preventing developers from entering false data. This can be 
accomplished by examining reliability of all the input data and imposing penalty on 
developers who input false data. But it is difficult for developers to thrust away the 
temptation of strategy ? because they know the fact that examining every input data is, in 
effect, impossible. Therefore, excluding strategy ? is not a proper way. 
  
4.2.2 Meta Game 
In the case of the first level meta game where developer B decides sub-strategy according 
to strategy choice of developer A, A has 2 strategies(?, ?) and B has following 4 
strategies. 
?? : To input reliable data regardless of developer A’s strategy. 
?? : To select the same strategy as expected A’s strategy. 
?? : To select the opposite strategy to expected A’s strategy. 
?? : To select false data regardless of A’s strategy. 
Table 4-3 is the matrix representing this situation. 
 
Table  4-3  First level Meta Game 
 
 
In the matrix above, strategy ? of developer A does not dominate over strategy ? 
anymore and strategy ?? of developer B dominates over the other three ones. Thus, 
strategy ? of A, strategy ?? of B are the only equilibrium point. But this does not 
necessarily mean cooperation (input of reliable data) between the two developers. In other 
words, solution for the first level meta game is not cooperative strategy. 
As Pareto optimal outcome is not obtained, developer A and B conduct the second level meta 
game in which developer B takes a sub-strategy and developer A selects a sub-strategy 
according to B’s sub-strategy. In this case, developer A has 16 strategies available as shown 
in Table 4-4. 
Table 4-4 Second level Meta Game 
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In Table 4-4, there is no dominant strategy for developer B while strategy ???? of 
developer A dominates over others. Therefore, developer B realizes that A will select ????, 
and thus selects strategy ?? favorable to B when A employs ????. Accordingly, ???? 
of A, ?? of B becomes equilibrium point of the second level meta game, as shown in Table 
4-4. So to speak, the best way for A is to believe that developer B will select the same 
strategy as him or her and take a cooperative strategy, and developer B knows the fact and 
selects the same strategy as A. Consequently, the players of the game have no choice but 
choosing a cooperative strategy in order to get maximum payoff. In this way, Pareto optimal 
solution for the second level meta game is obtained.?
?
5. Simulation Study 
Robert Axelrod maintained a natural evolution from competition to cooperation in his book
?The Evolution of Cooperation?[6]. The name of the game here is to demonstrate the 
question, “how can cooperation be developed in the world of fundamentally selfish agents?”  
This question involves following three questions: How can cooperation start? ; How can 
cooperative strategies survive better than non-cooperative ones? ; Which cooperative strategy 
can produce the best payoff and how can this dominate over the others [6]. He demonstrated 
these questions by applying prisoner’s dilemma game.   
This paper also applies the theory of Robert Axelrod to software development in order to 
change the developers behavior from competition to cooperation, and simulates this, using
?winpri?, a software developed by  Philippe Mathieu and Fredderic Grignion.  
Following figures are the outcomes obtained by simulating strategies selected by software 
developers through?winpri? after explaining 15 strategies of Robert Axelrod to them.?
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Figure 5-1  Cooperative Strategy among Defection Strategies 
 
 
Figure 5-2  Defection Strategy among Cooperative Strategies 
 
 
Figure 5-3  Dominant Strategy among Strategies 
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Figure 5-1 shows a cooperative strategy among defect strategies, and Figure 5-2 shows the 
payoff of a defection strategy among cooperative strategies. Finally, Figure 5-3 shows 
situations when cooperative strategies are mixed with defection strategies. In the early part of 
the game, defection strategies, “per-cd” and “defect” are seemed to dominate. But ultimately, 
"tit_for_tat" strategy (cooperating but retaliating partner’s defection with defection) produces 
the biggest payoff.  
???? ??????????? ?????? ????? ???????????? ????????? ??? ????????? ????? ???????? ????????????
?????????? ??? ????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ???????????? ??? ???????? ???? ???????? ?????????? ?????
?????????? ???????? ?????????? ????? ?????????????? ????????????? ??? ?? ??????? ??? ?????????? ??????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?
?????????????????????????????
In software development, quantitative process management is one of the most common 
techniques to improve visibility (transparency). CMM and SPICE also recommend that 
quantitative process management be adopted when the maturity of the software process 
reaches a certain level. But if reliability of data is damaged, quantitative process management 
becomes pointless because every activity for quantitative process management is based 
wholly on metrics data. Therefore, it is necessary to verify reliability of data. Many ways to 
analyze the reliability have been studied. Most of them, however, are just analysis methods 
for already collected data.  
Therefore, if the analysis finds that the existing data are not reliable, the data should be 
abandoned and new data be collected again, causing need to consume much time and effort. 
Therefore, as a way to improve reliability of measurement data to be collected, this paper 
deals with a technique to induce developers to input accurate data in the first place, instead of 
analyzing reliability of already collected data.   
This paper analyzes psychological factors affecting data input (e.g. psychology that 
somebody else will take responsibility), additional efforts needed to input data, besides 
software development, and the concern that the data may be used to evaluate individuals, and 
studies on the solutions.  
This paper finds the solution in the second level meta game of cooperative bimatrix games, 
applies the cooperation evolution theory of Robert Axelrod to the game, and demonstrates the 
solution to software developers by simulating the results of the application through ?winpri?
developed by Philippe Mathieu and Fredderic Grignion. As a result, reliability of 
measurement data is improved by 9.8%, compared to data collected with traditional methods. 
The next study may well deal with organizational behavior theory defining the relation of 
project manager, software developer, and SPI for successful project management through 
application of game theory. 
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